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Weapons of Mass Distortion:  Applying 
the Principles of the FCC’s News 
Distortion Doctrine to Undisclosed 
Financial Conflicts of Interest in 
Corporate News Media’s Military 
Coverage 
Charles L. Bonani* 
Abstract 
This Note offers a new conception of news distortion in mass 
media. It explores the intentions behind the FCC’s News Distortion 
Doctrine and analyzes its primarily dormant status throughout its 
existence. This Note then examines televised media coverage of U.S. 
military actions and identifies undisclosed financial conflicts of 
interests throughout this coverage. In examining these undisclosed 
conflicts and the reasons behind them, this Note explains why they 
constitute news distortion under the FCC’s definition, and why the 
principles behind the Doctrine are implicated. This Note then 
proposes the FCC promulgate a disclosure rule to remedy the 
undisclosed financial conflicts of interest. It also proposes that 
Congress amend the Communications Act of 1934 to authorize this 
rule promulgation. 
 
 *  Candidate for J.D., May 2021, Washington and Lee University School of 
Law. I would like to extend my sincerest appreciation and gratitude to everyone 
who helped me throughout the Note writing process: my Note Editor Jesse Sharp, 
Legal Research Professor Franklin Runge, Professors Carliss Chatman, Mona 
Houck and, most importantly, my faculty advisor Brian Murchison, who spent 
countless hours assisting me at every step of this process. This Note would not 
have been published without all of their comments and critiques. Last, I would 
like to thank my 1L Legal Writing Professor Allison Weiss and Legal Research 
Professor Andrew Christensen, who equipped me with the tools I needed to be 
able to write this Note. 
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I. Introduction 
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC)1 has made it 
clear that “[r]igging or slanting the news is a most heinous act 
against the public interest [and] . . . there is no act more harmful 
to the public’s ability to handle its affairs.”2 The agency has 
developed a policy over many decades, referred to as the News 
Distortion Doctrine (Doctrine), to address this concern.3 It applies 
to licensed broadcast stations and can be enforced only in licensing 
proceedings.4 Due to omnipresent First Amendment concerns, the 
Doctrine’s elements are strict and require an exorbitant amount of 
evidence before the FCC will investigate distortion allegations.5 
 
 1.  The Federal Communications Commission will be primarily referred to 
as the “FCC” throughout this note, but the term “Commission” is commonly used 
in judicial and FCC opinions. 
 2.  Complaints Covering CBS Program “Hunger in America,” 20 F.C.C.2d 
143, 151 (1969). 
 3.  See FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, THE MEDIA BUREAU, THE 
PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING:  HOW TO GET THE MOST SERVICE FROM YOUR LOCAL 
STATION, at 12 (2019) [hereinafter THE PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING] (presenting 
the News Distortion Doctrine in its entirety). 
 4.  See id. (listing the policies applicable to broadcast journalism and noting 
that “licensees may not intentionally distort the news”); see also Chad Raphael, 
The FCC’s Broadcast News Distortion Rules:  Regulation by Drooping Eyelid, 6 
COMM. L. & POL’Y 485, 498 (2001) (“Although the Commission sometimes 
considers distortion complaints on a case-by-case basis, it cannot impose fines for 
violations, but can only consider them in evaluating the overall character 
qualifications of broadcasters when they apply for license renewals.”). 
 5.  See Chad Raphael, The FCC’s Broadcast News Distortion Rules:  
Regulation by Drooping Eyelid, 6 COMM. L. & POL’Y 485, 495–96 (2001) (“In the 
absence of any of the four elements, the Commission has been unwilling to find 
distortion, or even to investigate a complaint.”). 
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The rigidity of the Doctrine, the FCC’s inconsistent enforcement of 
it, and the fact that it only applies to a subset of television media, 
have left the Doctrine unable to address the problem it was 
designed to solve.6 Examples of news distortion in corporate media 
present the same issues that the Doctrine was designed to address, 
yet extend beyond its reach.7 
This Note examines the history of the Doctrine, the policy 
reasons behind it and then, based on this foundation, proposes a 
new conception and application of news distortion in the modern 
televised media landscape. Part II analyzes the Doctrine’s history 
and looks at where it stands today.8 Part III looks at network news 
discussions on U.S. military actions and analyzes disturbing 
financial conflicts of interest with the U.S. Defense Department.9 
Part IV makes the case that these conflicts of interest are properly 
defined as news distortion, that they undermine the First 
Amendment’s ideals, that FCC action can counterintuitively 
further the First Amendment’s objectives, and that the current 
Doctrine is inadequate to address the issue.10 Part V proposes a 
statutory amendment to the Communications Act of 1934 to 
authorize the FCC to promulgate disclosure rules applicable to 
cable and satellite providers.11 It then proposes a model financial 
disclosure rule to address the issues presented in Part III. Part VI 






 6.  See id. at 488 (“[T]he Commission’s evidentiary requirements, burden of 
proof, shifting definition of news, and sometimes arbitrary reasoning impose a 
near-insurmountable burden on complainants.”). 
 7.  See THE PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING, supra note 3, at 7 (noting that the 
FCC only licenses “individual broadcast stations” and not “TV or radio networks”). 
 8.  See infra Part II.  
 9.  See infra Part III.  
 10.  See infra Part IV.  
 11.  See infra Part V.  
 12.  See infra Part VI.  
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II. The FCC’s News Distortion Doctrine 
A. Contemporary News Distortion Doctrine 
The FCC came into existence with the passage of the 
Communications Act of 1934.13 The Act authorized the FCC to 
license cable and radio broadcast stations and to approve 
applicants if it determined that “the public interest, convenience, 
and necessity” would be served by granting the application.14 The 
FCC only licenses individual broadcast stations and does “not 
license TV or radio networks (such as CBS, NBC, ABC or 
Fox) . . . except if those entities are also station licensees.”15 In fact, 
many of these network entities are licensees and thus their 
stations are subject to the FCC’s jurisdiction.16 In addition, cable 
operators that host cable networks (such as CNN, MSNBC, Fox 
News, etc.) are not licensees but are subject to a different 
regulatory scheme under the FCC’s jurisdiction.17 
The FCC’s News Distortion Doctrine applies only to licensed 
stations as part of the license application process.18 Licensees must 
periodically renew their licenses and, during this renewal period, 
the public can file petitions to deny a license renewal.19 Any news 
distortion allegations will be made as part of these petitions and, 
if the FCC finds that there are “substantial and material 
 
 13.  See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2018) (creating the FCC “[f]or the purpose of 
regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication . . .”). 
 14.  47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (2018).  
 15.  THE PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING, supra note 3, at 7. 
 16.  See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 247 (2012) 
(addressing indecency violations enforced against Fox and ABC, but striking 
them down on procedural grounds); see also Complaints Covering CBS Program 
“Hunger in America,” 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 143 (1969) (discussing and concluding a 
complaint on the merits involving the national CBS broadcast network). 
 17.  See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 
Stat. 2779 (authorizing FCC jurisdiction over cable); see also Turner Broad. Sys. 
v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180, 215–16 (1997) (upholding FCC regulations 
applying to cable). 
 18.  See, e.g., TVT License, Inc., 22 FCC Rcd. 13591, 13591 (2007) (noting that 
the FCC was reviewing the complainants petition to deny the license renewal of 
the licensee that allegedly committed news distortion). 
 19.  See 47 U.S.C. § 309(d) (2018) (providing any “party in interest” the right 
to petition a broadcaster’s license application). 
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question[s] of fact,” then it will proceed with the investigation by 
holding a hearing.20 The FCC may reject the petition and decline 
to hold a hearing, in which case the petitioner has a right to appeal 
the case to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit (D.C. Court of Appeals).21 Conversely, if the FCC finds that 
the station is not serving the public interest, then it may reject the 
station’s license renewal.22 If the FCC has concluded that the 
station distorted the news in violation of its policy, then that will 
be factored into its renewal decision.23 That is the full extent of the 
Doctrine’s enforcement authority, as it is not a promulgated rule 
that can be enforced on its own.24 
For clarity and orientation, the Doctrine is provided below in 
its entirety:  
The Commission often receives complaints concerning 
broadcast journalism, such as allegations that stations have 
aired inaccurate or one-sided news reports or comments, 
covered stories inadequately, or overly dramatized the events 
that they cover. For the reasons noted previously, the 
Commission generally will not intervene in these cases because 
it would be inconsistent with the First Amendment to replace 
the journalistic judgment of licensees with our own. However, 
as public trustees, broadcast licensees may not intentionally 
distort the news. The FCC has stated that “rigging or slanting 
the news is a most heinous act against the public interest.” The 
Commission will investigate a station for news distortion if it 
 
 20.  Id. § 309(e). 
 21.  See FCC v. WJR, Goodwill Station, Inc., 337 U.S. 265, 274 (1949) (holding 
that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals must review the FCC case before 
it on the merits). 
 22.  See THE PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING, supra note 3, at 8 (“Before we can 
renew a station’s license, we must first determine whether . . . the licensee has 
served the public interest . . . .”). 
 23.  See THE PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING, supra note 3, at 12 (discussing news 
distortion); see also Raphael, supra note 5, at 498 (“Although the Commission 
sometimes considers distortion complaints on a case-by-case basis, it cannot 
impose fines for violations, but can only consider them in evaluating the overall 
character qualifications of broadcasters when they apply for license renewals.”). 
 24.  See New World Commc’ns of Tampa, Inc. v. Akre, 866 So. 2d 1231, 1233 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (“The FCC has never published its news distortion policy 
as a regulation with definitive elements and defenses.”); see also Nareissa L. 
Smith, Consumer Protection in the Marketplace of Ideas:  A Proposal to Extend 
the News Distortion Doctrine to Cable Television News Programs, 40 T. MARSHALL 
L. REV. 223, 261 (2015) (“It is important to note that at this time, the doctrine is 
merely a policy—it has not been adopted as a rule.”). 
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receives documented evidence of rigging or slanting, such as 
testimony or other documentation, from individuals with direct 
personal knowledge that a licensee or its management engaged 
in the intentional falsification of the news. Of particular 
concern would be evidence of the direction to employees from 
station management to falsify the news. However, absent such 
a compelling showing, the Commission will not intervene.25 
Legal scholars have deduced four elements, from the FCC’s 
distortion reports and its above policy statement, that the 
complainant must satisfy before the FCC will classify it as news 
distortion.26 The FCC will only find news distortion if there is 
(1) an allegation “of deliberate intent to distort the news or mislead 
the audience,” (2) extrinsic evidence (in addition to the broadcast 
itself) to support the allegation, (3) evidence “that the distortion 
was initiated by or known to the licensee” or management 
personnel, and (4) an implication of a “significant event, rather 
than an incidental part of the news.”27 The extrinsic evidence 
element is the most decisive as most allegations are unable to meet 
this burden of proof.28 
As suggested from the Doctrine’s text, the FCC is extremely 
hesitant to even investigate news distortion allegations unless all 
four elements are met.29 This reluctance is understandable when 
considering the glaring concern that enforcing the Doctrine will 
lead to government censorship, or even the appearance of 
 
 25.  THE PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING, supra note 3, at 12. 
 26.  See Raphael, supra note 5, at 495 (“The Commission has never laid out a 
concise statement of what constitutes distortion, but it is possible to fashion a 
four-part test from its precedent decisions and subsequent actions.”). 
 27.  Id. at 496; see also Complaints Covering CBS Program “Hunger in 
America,” 20 F.C.C.2d 143, 150 (1969) (concluding that there must be “extrinsic 
evidence” of “deliberate distortion or staging” that “involves the licensee [and] 
includes its principals, top management, or news management”); WPIX, Inc. 
(WPIX), New York, New York for Renewal of License, 68 F.C.C.2d 381, 385 (1978) 
(concluding that news distortion must involve a “matter of significance” to the 
public interest). 
 28.  See “Hunger in America,” 20 F.C.C.2d at 147 (stating that “intervention 
by the [FCC] should be limited to cases where there is extrinsic evidence involving 
the licensee or management”). 
 29.  See Raphael, supra note 5, at 496 (“In the absence of any of the four 
elements, the Commission has been unwilling to find distortion, or even to 
investigate a complaint.”). 
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censorship, in violation of the First Amendment.30 These vital First 
Amendment issues will be addressed at length in Part VI.31 
The FCC’s last substantive discussion of the Doctrine was in 
2007, though news distortion allegations have been made as 
recently as 2017.32 The last judicial case to mention it was in 
2004.33 However, the Doctrine’s merits have not been considered 
since 1998.34 In total, the FCC has reviewed eight complaints 
involving the Doctrine since 1999 but only substantively discussed 
it two of those times.35 The FCC concluded in all these cases that 
there was insufficient evidence of news distortion.36 
The Doctrine is effectively dormant today, given the high 
standard of evidence needed to trigger an FCC investigation and 
the absence of a prescribed regulation.37 The Doctrine’s history, on 
the other hand, provides an insightful look into both the FCC’s 
reasoning behind its conception and the federal judiciary’s 
interpretation of its requirements.38  
 
 30.  See “Hunger in America,” 20 F.C.C.2d at 151 (“[I]n this democracy, no 
Government agency can authenticate the news, or should try to do so. We will 
therefore eschew the censor’s role, including efforts to establish news distortion 
in situations where Government intervention would constitute a worse danger 
than the possible rigging itself.”). 
 31.  See infra Part VI. First Amendment Constitutional Analysis 
 32.  See TVT License, Inc., 22 FCC Rcd. 13591, 13597 (2007) (finding no 
prima facie case of news distortion); see also Entercom Commc’n & CBS Radio 
Seek Approval to Transfer Control of and Assign FCC Authorizations & Licenses, 
32 FCC Rcd. 9380, 9384 (2017) (deciding the case without analyzing the distortion 
complaints on the merits). 
 33.  See New World Commc’ns. of Tampa, Inc. v. Akre, 866 So. 2d 1231, 1234 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that a whistleblower statute could not provide 
a remedy because the plaintiffs alleged a news distortion violation, but the FCC’s 
Doctrine was not a promulgated rule so it could not be enforced in this instance). 
 34.  See Serafyn v. FCC, 149 F.3d 1213, 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (concluding 
that the FCC arbitrarily and capriciously denied the complainant’s petition 
without fully considering the news distortion allegations). 
 35.  See Joel Timmer, Potential FCC Actions Against “Fake News”:  The News 
Distortion Policy and the Broadcast Hoax Rule, 24 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 20 (2019) 
(“In addition to these three cases, there were five other cases since 1999 in which 
the Commission considered allegations of news distortion. In only two of the eight 
cases was there any detailed discussion of news distortion.”). 
 36.  See id. (“Significantly, in none of the cases was news distortion found to 
have occurred.”). 
 37.  See id. at 22 (“[I]t is very difficult and uncommon for the requirements 
of the news distortion policy to be satisfied.”). 
 38.  See Raphael, supra note 5, at 496 (describing the various “forms of 
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B. History of the News Distortion Doctrine 
The FCC first expressed a concern for news distortion around 
the middle of the twentieth century.39 The Doctrine as it exists 
today originated in 1969 after Congress raised concerns about a 
particular distortion allegation.40 A congressman brought a 
complaint regarding a documentary program titled “Hunger in 
America” that had been broadcast multiple times on the Columbia 
Broadcasting System’s (CBS) national network.41 The allegations 
centered around aired footage of a dying infant claimed to be dying 
of malnutrition.42 The complainant alleged that such contention 
was false and, additionally, that CBS distorted the news by 
directing doctors’ interview statements.43 The FCC, finding 
conflicting evidence on both issues, declined to hold an evidentiary 
hearing and concluded that further inquiry to resolve the issue was 
unwarranted.44  
The FCC, in its reasoning, indicated a general hesitancy to 
wade into these issues on the ground that “investigat[ing] mere 
allegations, in the absence of a material indication of extrinsic 
evidence of staging or distortion, would clearly constitute a venture 
into a quagmire inappropriate for this Government agency.”45 The 
FCC was referring to the First Amendment’s prohibition on 
 
distortion” where the Commission has applied its distortion test). 
 39.  See New World Commc’ns. of Tampa, Inc. v. Akre, 866 So. 2d 1231, 1233 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (“The policy’s roots can be traced to 1949 when the FCC 
first expressed its concern regarding deceptive news . . . .”). 
 40.  See Raphael, supra note 5, at 495 (“[I]t was not until a series of 1969-
1973 decisions that the Commission began to formalize its definition of distortion. 
The FCC did not do so on its own initiative, but in response to Congressional 
pressure.”). 
 41.  See Complaints Covering CBS Program “Hunger in America,” 20 
F.C.C.2d 143, 143 (1969) (stating that there are several complaints before the 
FCC concerning the “Hunger in America” documentary program). 
 42.  See id. at 144 (“The complaint of Congressman Gonzales charges that 
segments of the program were ‘totally false in part and erroneous or misleading 
in other parts’ . . . .”). 
 43.  See id. (summarizing the complainant’s allegation that CBS “‘coached’ a 
doctor to ‘make dramatic statements’ on malnutrition in San Antonio”). 
 44.  See id. at 147 (concluding that policy concerns regarding editorial 
discretion superseded the need for further investigation). 
 45.  Id. at 150. 
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government infringement of a free press, which compels significant 
editorial discretion for news broadcasters.46  
The FCC went on to state that future complaints with similar 
evidentiary issues would not warrant further investigation.47 
Instead, it would only consider denying a licensee’s renewal if there 
was an allegation of “deliberate distortion or staging of the news 
which is brought to [the FCC’s] attention, involves the licensee, 
[and] includes its principals, top management, or news 
management.”48 The FCC added to the rigor of its distortion test a 
decade later, declaring that the subject of the distortion allegation 
must be a “matter of significance” to the public interest.49 This 
means that the subject matter at issue must be serious enough that 
distortion of its reporting warrants agency action, though the FCC 
has not defined the phrase.50 This last requirement rounded out 
the FCC’s four-element distortion policy that exists today.51 
1. The FCC’s News Distortion Opinions 
According to a thirty-year study analyzing the FCC’s reported 
decisions between 1969 and 1999, the FCC published 120 decisions 
on distortion investigations.52 Of those 120 decisions, it ruled 
 
 46.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of . . . the press . . . .”); see also THE PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING, supra 
note 3, at 12 (“[I]t would be inconsistent with the First Amendment to replace the 
journalistic judgment of licensees with our own.”); see also Ark. Educ. Television 
Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673 (1998) (noting that broadcasters must 
“exercise substantial editorial discretion in the selection and presentation of their 
programming . . . .”). 
 47.  See “Hunger in America,” 20 F.C.C.2d at 150 (stating that the FCC does 
“not intend to defer action on license renewals . . . of the kind we have 
investigated here” in the future). 
 48.  Id. at 150. 
 49.  See WPIX, Inc. (WPIX), New York, New York for Renewal of License, 68 
F.C.C.2d 381, 385 (1978) (concluding that none of the news incidents deceived the 
public about a matter of significance). 
 50.  See id. at 384–85 (noting that there were only incidents of “inaccurate 
embellishments concerning peripheral aspects” of the news). 
 51.  See THE PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING, supra note 25 and accompanying 
text (providing the current News Distortion Doctrine in its entirety). 
 52.  See Raphael, supra note 5, at 501 (noting that the FCC only “found 
against broadcasters in 10%” of the reported decisions). 
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against the broadcasters on only twelve occasions.53 Of the twelve 
adverse rulings, three of them ended with the FCC either revoking 
or declining to renew the broadcaster’s license.54 Hesitancy to 
enforce the Doctrine is consistent with the Doctrine itself, which 
emphasizes the latitude afforded to news editorial discretion under 
the First Amendment.55 
In an example of enforcing the Doctrine against a licensee, the 
FCC removed multiple licenses from Star Stations, Inc. (Star 
Station), a corporation that owned several broadcast companies 
across three states.56 The FCC rejected Star Stations’ license 
renewal after finding that its owner “had used two of his radio 
stations to promote political candidates through the news, and to 
make illegal campaign contributions to them.”57 The FCC 
explained that such an action rose to the level of news distortion 
because the “newscasts were used as a vehicle to publicize [the 
owner’s] preferred candidate—not as an exercise of news 
judgment, but as a deception of the public and to further his 
private interests.”58 The FCC made it clear that this type of 
conduct warrants action, stating that “[s]uch attempts to use 
broadcast facilities to subvert the political process cannot be 
ignored or condoned.”59 
2. The Federal Judiciary’s News Doctrine Opinions 
Although there have been a number of FCC memorandum 
opinions on distortion allegations, federal courts have heard only 
 
 53.  See id. (“The Commission has rarely held licensees in violation of the 
distortion rules.”). 
 54.  See id. at 504 (“Findings of distortion did contribute to three license 
nonrenewals over the thirty year period [from 1969 to 1999] under study.”). 
 55.  See THE PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING, supra note 3, at 12 (“[I]t would be 
inconsistent with the First Amendment to replace the journalistic judgment of 
licensees with our own.”). 
 56.  See Raphael, supra note 5, at 504–05 (noting that the FCC removed 
several of the corporation’s licenses for, among other acts, “committing a felony 
by making illegal campaign contributions, and distorting news”); see also Star 
Stations of Indiana, Inc., 51 F.C.C.2d 95, 109 (1975) (denying three applications 
for license renewal). 
 57.  Raphael, supra note 5, at 505. 
 58.  Star Stations, 51 F.C.C.2d at 107. 
 59.  Id. 
242 27 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 231 (2020) 
two distortion cases.60 In Galloway v. FCC, the petitioner filed a 
complaint with the FCC alleging that the 60 Minutes program on 
CBS deliberately distorted a report on insurance fraud by having 
its subjects stage interviews and present misleading facts.61 The 
FCC dismissed the complaint, reasoning that the staged 
interviews were a matter of “editorial judgment.”62 The D.C. Court 
of Appeals disagreed in part, finding that the allegations provided 
circumstantial evidence of a staged, or distorted, report.63 The 
court upheld the FCC’s dismissal because it found that the event’s 
“basic accuracy” had not been distorted and thus there was no 
actionable news distortion.64  
In Serafyn v. FCC, the petitioner filed a license renewal 
complaint to the FCC, alleging that CBS acted against the public 
interest by intentionally distorting a story about Ukraine that 
depicted a majority of Ukrainians as anti-Semitic.65 The petitioner 
brought the complaint under Section 309(d) of the 
Communications Act of 193466 and, after the FCC rejected his 
petition, sought review in the D.C. Court of Appeals.67 The court 
outlined a two-step analysis that the FCC should apply in these 
cases.68 First, the FCC must analyze whether there is a prima facie 
case of news distortion.69 Second, the FCC must analyze “both the 
 
 60.  See Galloway v. FCC, 778 F.2d 16, 23 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (concluding that 
the complainant’s allegations did not rise to the level of an FCC rule violation); 
see also Serafyn v. FCC, 149 F.3d 1213, 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (concluding that the 
FCC arbitrarily and capriciously denied the complainants petition without fully 
considering the evidence). 
 61.  See Galloway, 778 F.2d at 18 (stating the petitioner’s claim “that his 
name had been forged on the fraudulent bill . . . .”). 
 62.  Id. at 21. 
 63.  See id. (noting that the FCC “is unlikely to find better circumstantial 
evidence that an interview is staged”). 
 64.  Id. at 20–21. 
 65.  See Serafyn, 149 F.3d at 1213, 1216 (noting that “Serafyn objected that 
CBS was not fit to receive a license . . . .”). 
 66.  See 47 U.S.C. § 309(d) (2018) (granting interested persons the right to 
petition the FCC to deny a broadcast license application). 
 67.  See Serafyn, 149 F.3d at 1213, 1216 (noting the FCC denied the petition 
on the ground Serafyn did not allege the matter was intentionally 
misrepresented). 
 68.  See id. at 1219 (“[W]e note that the Commission never explained under 
which step of the inquiry it resolved this case.”). 
 69.  See id. at 1220 (highlighting the “appropriate questions for the 
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substantiality and the materiality of the allegation” to determine 
whether the broadcaster can sufficiently serve the public 
interest.70 Materiality will only be found where “the licensee itself 
is said to have participated in, directed, or at least acquiesced in a 
pattern of news distortion.”71 The court found that the FCC 
conflated these two steps when it dismissed the petitioner’s 
complaint.72 
Both Galloway and Serafyn illustrate the judiciary’s view that 
the FCC has been unduly passive when reviewing allegations of 
news distortion.73 Moreover, the FCC’s distortion decisions since 
these cases indicate that it remains hesitant to find prima facie 
evidence of news distortion.74 For example, in a 2013 case, the FCC 
declined to further investigate allegations that General 
Communications, Inc. (GCI), the corporate owner of multiple 
Alaskan broadcast stations, was threatening to distort the news to 
serve its business interests.75 The distortion allegations, among a 
number of complaints, were brought by nine television licensees, 
collectively referred to as the Alaska Broadcasters.76 The Alaska 
Broadcasters alleged that GCI threatened to distort the news in 
violation of the public interest when it “explicitly told other 
stations and potential employees that it plan[ned] to tailor the 
news to be more ‘business-friendly’ [in order to] assure viewpoints 
favorable to GCI’s corporate interests.”77 The FCC stated in 
response that the allegations, “even if true, would be insufficient 
 
Commission to ask at the threshold stage”). 
 70.  Id. at 1216. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  See id. at 1220 (“[T]he Commission has misapplied its standard . . . .”). 
 73.  See Galloway v. FCC, 778 F.2d 16, 20–21 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“[T]he [FCC’s] 
practice in this respect has given its policy against news distortion an extremely 
limited scope.”). 
 74.  See Timmer, supra note 35, at 20 (observing that the FCC has reviewed 
eight distortion cases since 1999 but concluded in all of them that there was 
insufficient evidence of news distortion). 
 75.  See Affiliated Media, Inc., 28 FCC Rcd. 14873, 14881 (2013) (concluding 
that the distortion allegations, if true, would only amount to protected editorial 
discretion). 
 76.  See id. at 14873 (describing the particular group of complainants as 
“licensees of nine television stations in Anchorage, Fairbanks, Juneau, and 
Sitka”). 
 77.  Id. at 14881. 
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to make out a prima facie showing that grant of the Applications 
would be inconsistent with the public interest.”78 The FCC’s 
reasoning was that “[t]he First Amendment and section 326 of the 
Communications Act bar us from withholding approval of a 
transaction based on a change in editorial perspective.”79  
The FCC thus implied that agency action here would amount 
to censorship, as that is what section 326 expressly prohibits.80 
This example illustrates the FCC’s broad interpretation of what 
qualifies as editorial discretion, subject only to the requirement 
that the licensee operate in good faith.81 Based on this 
interpretation, it is hard to see what would cross the line from 
editorial discretion to news distortion under the FCC’s current 
policy.82 With this interpretation in mind, the FCC’s hesitancy to 
enforce the news distortion policy can be properly understood.83 
Any licensee action considered to be within the scope of editorial 
discretion is awarded full First Amendment protection, which in 
turn leaves limited room for the FCC to enforce its current news 
distortion policy.84 The Doctrine’s rigidity, combined with the 
FCC’s reluctance to investigate cases appearing to be news 
distortion on their face, necessitates a new approach to 
accomplishing the FCC’s goal of protecting the “public’s ability to 
handle its affairs.”85 Part III will highlight news distortion 
 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 80.  See 47 U.S.C. § 326 (2018) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be understood 
or construed to give the [FCC] the power of censorship . . . , and no regulation or 
condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the [FCC] which shall interfere with 
the right of free speech by means of radio communication.”). 
 81.  See Affiliated Media, Inc., 28 FCC Rcd. 14873, 14881 (2013) (ending the 
opinion by stating that “[l]icensees are entitled to exercise ‘good faith’ editorial 
discretion” without indicating what might violate that standard).  
 82.  See THE PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING, supra note 3, at 12 (stating that 
broadcasters may not intentionally slant news presentation). 
 83.  See Raphael, supra note 5, at 501 (noting that the FCC only “found 
against broadcasters in 10%” of the reported decisions). 
 84.  See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673 (1998) 
(“As a general rule, the nature of editorial discretion counsels against subjecting 
broadcasters to claims of viewpoint discrimination.”). 
 85.  See Complaints Covering CBS Program “Hunger in America,” 20 
F.C.C.2d 143, 151 (1969) (discussing how the rigging of news is the most harmful 
act against the public interest). 
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examples, in line with the Alaska Broadcasters case, that further 
emphasizes the need for a new doctrinal approach. 
III. A New Kind of News Distortion:  A Focus on Undisclosed 
Financial Conflicts of Interest in Corporate Media Coverage of 
U.S. Military Actions 
Corporate media ownership has become increasingly 
consolidated over the past several decades.86 From 1983 to 2011, 
ninety percent of U.S. media went from being owned by fifty 
companies to six.87 This was primarily due to consistent 
deregulations from both the FCC and Congress.88 Analysis of this 
deregulation is beyond the scope of this Note but provides 
important context for discussing the prevalence of financial 
conflicts of interest in corporate media.89 
A. The First Case Study:  GE, NBC, and the Iraq War 
General Electric Company (GE) purchased the National 
Broadcasting Company (NBC) in 1985.90 It owned a majority share 
 
 86.  See Sean M. McGuire, Media Influence and the Modern American 
Democracy:  Why the First Amendment Compels Regulation of Media Ownership, 
4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 689, 703 (2006) (“Perhaps the most dominant 
characteristic of the media industry is the tendency toward larger, fewer, and 
more centralized ownership groups.”). 
 87.  See Ashley Lutz, These 6 Corporations Control 90% of the Media in 
America, BUSINESS INSIDER (June 14, 2012, 9:49 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/these-6-corporations-control-90-of-the-media-
in-america-2012-6 (last visited Sept. 25, 2020) (showing an infographic 
illustrating “that almost all media comes from the same six sources”) 
[perma.cc/EB62-PXQV]. 
 88.  See McGuire, supra note 86, at 702 (“Then, in 1996, Congress joined the 
deregulation frenzy, passing the Telecommunications Act of 1996 . . . [which] 
eliminated all caps on national radio station ownership.”). 
 89.  See id. at 704 (noting that “five companies control eighty percent of the 
[television] viewing audience”).  
 90.  See David Goldman & Julianne Pepitone, GE, Comcast Announce Joint 
NBC Deal, CNN MONEY (Dec. 3, 2009, 9:57 AM), 
https://money.cnn.com/2009/12/03/news/companies/comcast_nbc/index.htm (last 
visited Sept 27, 2019) (stating that GE bought NBC “for $6.3 billion to act as a 
hedge against its industrial businesses”) [perma.cc/XF39-9GBS]. 
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in the company until 2009 and a minority share until 2013.91 At 
the same time, GE was also a major Defense Department 
contractor that manufactured and supplied equipment to the U.S. 
military.92 “In 2004, when the Pentagon released its list of top 
military contractors for the latest fiscal year, [GE] ranked eighth 
with $2.8 billion in contracts.”93 Authors Martin E. Lee and 
Norman Solomon defined the financial relationship this way:  
“[W]hen correspondents and paid consultants on NBC television 
praised the performance of U.S. weapons, they were extolling 
equipment made by GE, the corporation that pays their salaries.”94 
Leading up to the Iraq war, the national political discussion 
was consumed over whether the United States should declare war 
upon and invade Iraq, so the national news heavily revolved 
around this central issue.95 NBC and its 24/7 cable news channel, 
MSNBC, frequently reported on this issue.96 In 2003—three weeks 
before the U.S. military invaded Iraq—MSNBC television host 
Phil Donahue had his regularly programmed show cancelled by 
network executives.97 Evidence presented in a leaked internal 
 
 91.  See id. (“Comcast will take a controlling 51% stake in the [NBC] joint 
venture, and GE will control 49%.”); see also David Lieberman, Comcast 
Completes Acquisition of GE’s 49% Stake in NBCUniversal, DEADLINE (Mar. 19, 
2013, 2:15 PM), https://deadline.com/2012/03/comcast-completes-acquisition-
nbcuniversal-457181/ (last visited on Sept. 27, 2019) (stating that GE is “out of 
the NBCUniversal business”) [perma.cc/CC48-UQTL]. 
 92.  See Norman Solomon, The Military-Industrial-Media Complex, FAIRNESS 
& ACCURACY IN REPORTING (Aug. 1, 2005), https://fair.org/extra/the-military-
industrial-media-complex/ (last visited on Sept. 27, 2019) (stating that “NBC’s 
owner General Electric designed, manufactured or supplied parts or maintenance 
for nearly every major weapon system used by the U.S. during the Gulf War”) 
[perma.cc/V942-AP6P]. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  See Robert Bejesky, Press Clause Aspirations and the Iraq War, 48 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 343, 349 (2012) (“PBS reported that there were ‘414 Iraq 
stories broadcast on NBC, ABC and CBS nightly news, from September 2002 until 
February 2003 . . . .’’). 
 96.  See id. at 370 (mentioning that MSNBC hosted a program titled 
“Countdown:  Iraq with Lester Holt”). 
 97.  See Some Critical Media Voices Face Censorship, FAIRNESS & ACCURACY 
IN REPORTING (Apr. 3, 2003), https://fair.org/press-release/some-critical-media-
voices-face-censorship/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2020) (“Starting before the [Iraq] war 
began, several national and local media figures have had their work jeopardized, 
either explicitly or implicitly because of the critical views they expressed on the 
war.”) [perma.cc/2BG5-BRTE]. 
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NBC memorandum indicated that the show was cancelled due to 
Donahue’s tendency to present viewpoints opposing the 
government’s official position, meaning viewpoints expressing 
opposition to the Iraq war.98 Even before the show’s cancellation, 
network executives “imposed a quota system on the Donahue staff 
requiring two pro-war guests if [the show] booked one anti-war 
advocate.”99 In an interview years later, Donahue contextualized 
his firing, stating, “If you’re GE, you certainly don’t want an 
anti-war voice on a cable channel that you own . . . . We weren’t 
good for business.”100 
Around this same time, former pundit and MSNBC producer 
Jeff Cohen was removed from MSNBC’s airwaves for reasons he 
claims were related to his opposition to military conflict.101 Cohen 
claimed that he “argued vigorously against invading Iraq in 
debates televised on MSNBC . . . . But as the war neared, [his] 
debates were terminated.”102 He described the executives’ editorial 
decision-making as follows:  “In the land of the First Amendment, 
it was [the executives’] choice to shut down debate and 
journalism.”103 
B. The Second Case Study:  The Pentagon Pundit Program 
 
 98.  See id. (quoting that Donahue’s show presented a “difficult public face 
for NBC in a time of war . . . [because he] seems to delight in presenting guests 
who are anti-war, anti-Bush and skeptical of the administration’s motives”). 
 99.  Jeff Cohen, Military Propaganda Pushed Me Off TV, HUFFINGTON POST, 
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/military-propaganda-pushe_b_98925 (last 
updated May 25, 2011) (last visited Nov. 16, 2019) [perma.cc/F9NQ-SRMT]. 
 100.  Democracy Now!, Phil Donahue on His 2003 Firing From MSNBC, When 
Liberal Network Couldn’t Tolerate Antiwar Voices, YOUTUBE (Mar. 21, 2013), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ozxzNjRqCiE&t=7s (last visited Feb. 21, 
2020) [perma.cc/E2MJ-3V7X]. 
 101.  See JEFF COHEN, CABLE NEWS CONFIDENTIAL:  MY MISADVENTURES IN 
CORPORATE MEDIA 135 (2006) (“There was no room for me after MSNBC launched 
Countdown:  Iraq—a daily one-hour show that seemed more keen on glamorizing 
a potential war than scrutinizing or debating it.”). 
 102.  Jeff Cohen, Military Propaganda Pushed Me Off TV, HUFFINGTON POST 
(last updated May 25, 2011) https://www.huffpost.com/entry/military-
propaganda-pushe_b_98925 (last visited Nov. 16, 2019) [perma.cc/2FT3-ZTWS]. 
 103.  Id. 
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NBC is not the only major media corporation with this type of 
financial conflict of interest:  In 2010, four out of the top ten media 
corporations shared board director positions with major Defense 
Department contractors.104 
The most pervasive type of financial conflict of interest, 
however, came from the so-called Pentagon Pundit Program 
(Program), in which about seventy-five retired military officers 
worked as media analysts as part of a concerted Pentagon effort 
“to generate favorable news coverage of the administration’s 
wartime performance.”105 These analysts would appear on all of 
the national media networks to commentate on U.S. military 
policy, and “[m]ost of the analysts ha[d] ties to military contractors 
vested in the very war policies they are asked to assess on air.”106 
The networks had occasional awareness of these financial 
relationships but the viewers were almost never aware.107 This 
program generated considerable controversy and led to a U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) investigation to 
determine whether the Defense Department had inappropriately 
engaged in propaganda activities.108  
 
 104.  See Peter Phillips & Mickey Huff, Inside the Military Media Industrial 
Complex:  Impacts on Movements for Peace and Social Justice, PROJECT CENSORED 
(May 3, 2010), https://www.projectcensored.org/inside-the-military-media-
industrial-complex-impacts-on-movements-for-peace/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2020) 
(listing two board members of Disney, which owns ABC, who are also board 
members for Boeing and Halliburton, two major Defense Department contractors) 
[perma.cc/AE42-HF24]; see also Justin Schlosberg, The 
Media-Technology-Military Industrial Complex, OPENDEMOCRACY (Jan. 27, 2017), 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/media-technology-military-industrial-
complex/ (last visited Nov. 16, 2019) (“[L]ess prominent is the interlocking 
directorate between media, the state and the defence industry. William Kennard, 
for instance, has served on the boards of the New York Times, AT&T and a 
number of companies owned by the Carlyle Group, a major US defense 
contractor.”) [perma.cc/9MJU-NVQF]. 
 105.  David Barstow, Behind TV Analysts, Pentagon’s Hidden Hand, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 20, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/20/us/20generals.html 
(last visited Sept. 23, 2020) [hereinafter Pentagon’s Hidden Hand] (describing the 
Pentagon’s covert, coordinated program of having retired military generals go on 
cable networks as analysts and advocate for their pro-war position, often to the 
acquiescence of the media outlets) [perma.cc/EM6Y-5AKL]. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  See id. (noting that the “business relationships are hardly ever disclosed 
to the viewers, and sometimes not even to the networks themselves.”). 
 108.  See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, B-316443, RETIRED MILITARY 
OFFICERS AS MEDIA ANALYSTS (2009) (concluding that the financial relationships 
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The story of one of these retired military officers, General 
Barry R. McCaffrey, helps provide some insight into how this 
entanglement of financial interests operates.109 General McCaffrey 
was a retired four-star Army general and NBC News military 
analyst.110 He had significant governmental influence, “such that 
President [George W.] Bush and Congressional leaders from both 
parties have invited him for war consultations.”111 In addition, his 
“access is such that . . . the Pentagon has arranged numerous trips 
to Iraq, Afghanistan and other hotspots solely for his benefit.”112 
General McCaffrey simultaneously did business with a number of 
companies that had financial relationships with the Defense 
Department.113 Then, in his role as an NBC military analyst, 
General McCaffrey would advocate for “wartime policies and 
spending priorities that are in line with his corporate interests,” 
despite the fact that “those interests are not described to NBC’s 
viewers.”114 As a military analyst, he is presented “as a 
dispassionate expert, not someone who helps companies win 
contracts related to the wars he discusses on television.”115 General 
McCaffrey’s financial ties were never disclosed on air, but “NBC 
executives asserted that the general’s relationships with military 
contractors are indirectly disclosed” because his biography is on 
NBC’s website, which links to his consulting firm’s website that 
provides all the relevant disclosures.116 His website, however, 
 
raised important questions but did not “implicate the prohibition on the use of 
appropriations for publicity or propaganda purposes . . .”). 
 109. See David Barstow, One Man’s Military-Industrial-Media Complex, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 29, 2008), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/30/washington/30general.html (last visited 
Nov. 16, 2019) [hereinafter One Man’s Military-Industrial-Media Complex] 
(detailing how General McCaffrey used his role as a military analyst to promote 
his financial interests with the Defense Department) [perma.cc/QB2J-6W83]. 
 110.  See id. (describing General McCaffrey’s influence on network news 
programs). 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  See id. (noting that “General McCaffrey has immersed himself in 
businesses that have grown with the fight against terrorism,” such as Defense 
Department contractors Defense Solutions and HNTB Federal Services, as well 
as the private equity firm Veritas Capital, which owns equity in contractors). 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
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listed “his board memberships” but did “not name his clients.”117 
NBC News’ president at the time, Steve Capus, maintained that 
“he was unaware of General McCaffrey’s connection” to a Defense 
Department contract awarded to Veritas Capital, a private equity 
firm that General McCaffrey was working for at the time.118 “Mr. 
Capus declined to comment on whether this information should 
have been disclosed.”119 
C. Undisclosed Financial Conflicts of Interest in Corporate Media 
Continue to Take Place 
Similar undisclosed financial conflicts of interest have 
continued to this day.120 For example, on January 5, 2020, NBC 
had former Homeland Security Secretary Jeh Johnson on its Meet 
the Press program to discuss the U.S. military strike that killed 
Iranian General Qassem Soleimani.121 NBC failed to disclose, 
however, that Johnson, at the time of his appearance, was a board 
member of Defense Department contractor Lockheed Martin.122 In 
fact, nine other analysts brought on cable news to discuss this 
military action were revealed to have undisclosed financial 
relationships to the Defense Department.123 
 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  See Robert Parry, Ukraine, through the US Looking Glass, CONSORTIUM 
NEWS (Apr. 16, 2014), http://consortiumnews.com/2014/04/16/ukraine-through-
the-us-looking-glass/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2020) (providing instances of the U.S. 
media allegedly distorting coverage of the Ukraine-Russia tensions) 
[perma.cc/57F3-RAQ8]. 
 121.  See Meet the Press – January 5, 2020, NBC NEWS (Jan. 5, 2020), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/meet-press-january-5-2020-n1110181 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2020) (providing the full transcript of the day’s Meet the 
Press program) [perma.cc/WP9F-3FCX]. 
 122.  See Judd Legum (@JuddLegum), TWITTER (Jan. 5, 2020, 2:34 PM), 
https://twitter.com/JuddLegum/status/1213906520359997440 (last visited Feb. 
21, 2020) (quoting Jeh Johnson’s Meet the Press statements and providing a 
screenshot of his Lockheed Martin biography) [perma.cc/2EGU-4DKU]. 
 123.  See Judd Legum, 9 Iran Pundits With Undisclosed Ties to the Defense 
Industry, POPULAR INFORMATION (Jan. 9, 2020), popular.info/p/9-iran-pundits-
with-undisclosed-ties (last visited Feb. 17, 2020) (noting that “[v]iewers are not 
told of the pundits’ current role in the private sector or their defense industry 
ties.”) [perma.cc/XT6J-QFUZ]. 
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IV. The Case for FCC Regulation of Undisclosed Financial 
Conflicts of Interest 
In order to get a sense of why undisclosed financial conflicts of 
interest in corporate media are aptly defined as news distortion, it 
is essential to (1) look to the FCC’s own interpretation of and 
intention behind its news distortion policy, and (2) examine the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s (Supreme Court) view of the FCC’s 
regulatory function.124 
A. The Policy Reasons Behind the News Distortion Doctrine 
The FCC has been saddled with the arduous task of creating 
regulations that serve the “public interest.”125 Two primary 
regulatory purposes can be fashioned out of this standard:  (1) To 
protect the public’s interest in consuming factually based news and 
information, and (2) to ensure that the broadcasting framework 
furthers citizen self-governance.126 The News Distortion Doctrine 
arose out of these purposes, with the FCC stating in 1949, in its 
first on-the-record statement addressing news distortion, that 
“[t]he basis for any fair consideration of public issues, and 
particularly those of a controversial nature, is the presentation of 
news and information concerning the basic facts of the controversy 
in as complete and impartial a manner as possible.”127 It went on 
to assert that the “licensee would be abusing his position as public 
trustee . . . were he to withhold from expression over his facilities 
relevant news or facts concerning a controversy or to slant or 
 
 124.  See Bejesky, supra note 95, at 359–60 (describing how the government’s 
official position dominated Iraq war media coverage at the expense of other 
sources and viewpoints). 
 125.  47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (2018).  
 126.  See Complaints Covering CBS Program “Hunger in America,” 20 
F.C.C.2d 143, 151 (1969) (asserting that “[i]n all cases where way may 
appropriately do so, we shall act to protect the public interest in” consuming news 
that has not been intentionally distorted); see also Complaint Concerning the CBS 
Program “The Selling of the Pentagon,” 30 F.C.C.2d 150, 153 (1971) (“[The FCC 
has] allocated so much spectrum space to broadcasting precisely because of the 
contribution it can make to an informed public.”). 
 127.  Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1254 
(1949). 
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distort the presentation [of] the news.”128 The FCC asserted that 
licensee regulation is appropriate as a means of “ensuring the 
conditions for free-wheeling coverage of public affairs and the 
contribution [broadcasting] could make to citizen 
self-governance.”129 It has gone further in recognizing a concern for 
the public good, stating that “[r]igging or slanting the news is a 
most heinous act against the public interest [and] . . . there is no 
act more harmful to the public’s ability to handle its affairs.”130 
The FCC has interpreted its distortion policy to apply “to a 
wide range of forms of distortion, including staging (or rigging), 
slanting, falsification, deception (or misrepresentation) and 
suppression.”131 The two most relevant forms for the purposes of 
this Note are deception (or misrepresentation) and slanting.132 The 
former is concerned with “misleading the public about the source 
of information, such as presenting questions and suggestions 
written by news staff as if they were posed by viewers.”133 Slanting 
is concerned with “the use of deliberate inaccuracy to favor one 
viewpoint, or disfavor another, on a matter of public 
significance.”134 This can encompass “the systematic promotion or 
suppression of stories or viewpoints to serve the licensee’s 
ideological views or business interests.”135 The FCC is “willing to 
discipline broadcasters for this type of speech” because it considers 
it to be “less worthy of First Amendment protection.”136 It reasons 
that since “the danger is manipulation of the news to further the 
licensee’s business interests, rather than manipulation of the news 
 
 128.  Id. at 1254–55. 
 129.  Raphael, supra note 5, at 494. 
 130.  “Hunger in America,” 20 F.C.C.2d at 151. 
 131.  Raphael, supra note 5, at 496. 
 132.  See id. at 497 (listing the FCC’s various applications of its News 
Distortion Doctrine but clarifying that it “has not attempted any comparably clear 
definition” of these terms). 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. at 497–98; see also Michael D. Bramble Complaint Against Paul 
Bunyan Broad. Co., 58 F.C.C.2d 565, 572 (1976) (“[T]he Commission believes that 
the deliberate suppression or attempted suppression of news because of the 
licensee’s private interests, personal opinions or prejudices is a form of ‘rigging,’ 
‘slanting,’ or ‘deliberate distortion’ of the overall news presentation of the 
station.”). 
 136.  Raphael, supra note 5, at 529. 
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to create a biased or one-sided impression on public issues,” the 
FCC “need not be as hesitant in imposing a sanction” because 
“there is less potential for [government] censorship.”137 
The undisclosed financial conflicts of interest presented in 
Part III effectively misrepresent the information and slant its 
presentation in furtherance of financial interests, thus qualifying 
as news distortion.138 In both case studies, viewers were not told 
throughout its Iraq war coverage of the network’s financial 
relationship to the Defense Department, thus having no context to 
understand the lens through which the news was being 
presented.139 A network’s or analyst’s financial relationship to the 
Defense Department is certainly relevant when the discussion is 
centered around whether that department should take military 
action.140 On-air disclosure of this information would likely provide 
the viewers with a better understanding of why the news was 
slanted in the way that it was or why Phil Donahue was summarily 
fired.141 This Note does not propose a revival of the Fairness 
Doctrine, which mandated networks to present both sides of a 
news story, but seeks rather to provide viewers with the relevant 
information to allow them to decide for themselves whether news 
coverage is slanted or not.142 
 
 137.  Application of WMJX, Inc., 85 F.C.C.2d 251, 266 (1981). 
 138.  See Bejesky, supra note 95, at 353 (observing that “[n]inety-five percent 
of citizens were wrong” about whether Iraq had, or was trying to develop, weapons 
of mass destruction, “perhaps because they did not possess a satisfactory 
understanding to make an objective and informed assessment with the 
information they received from the media”). 
 139. See supra Part III (detailing these conflicts of interest and the networks’ 
failures to disclose them on-air). 
 140.  See Conflict of Interest, MERRIAM-WEBSTER https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/conflict%20of%20interest (last visited Feb. 21, 2020) 
(defining a conflict of interest as “a conflict between the private interests and the 
official responsibilities of a person in a position of trust.”) [perma.cc/EBZ8-
6WGB]. 
 141.  See supra note 100 and accompanying text (providing footage of Phil 
Donahue contextualizing his firing from MSNBC and describing how his show 
was bad for the network’s business). 
 142.  See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369 (1969) (describing the 
mandates of the FCC’s Fairness Doctrine). 
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B. The Supreme Court’s Position on the FCC’s Regulatory Role 
The Supreme Court has made it clear that “[i]t is the purpose 
of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of 
ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to 
countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the 
government itself or a private licensee.”143 Justice Stephen Breyer 
observed that “democratic government presupposes and the First 
Amendment seeks to achieve” the facilitation of “public discussion 
and informed deliberation.”144  
In this spirit, the Court has stated that FCC policy should be 
crafted to foster “the widest possible dissemination of information 
from diverse and antagonistic sources” because this is “essential to 
the welfare of the public.”145 It has afforded the FCC significant 
regulatory discretion to promote this public interest standard.146 
This regulatory role is considered vital because “freedom of speech 
from governmental interference under the First Amendment does 
not sanction repression of that freedom by private interests.”147 
The Supreme Court reiterated its concern for speech 
suppression by private interests when it reviewed the 
constitutionality of the now-repealed Fairness Doctrine, which 
required broadcast stations to discuss public issues and ensure 
“that each side of those issues [is] . . . given fair coverage.”148 The 
Supreme Court held the doctrine to be constitutional, stating that 
“[t]here is no sanctuary in the First Amendment for unlimited 
private censorship operating in a medium not open to all.”149 The 
 
 143.  Id. at 390. 
 144.  Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180, 227 (1997) (Breyer, 
J., concurring). 
 145.  Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 663 (1994) (quoting 
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)). 
 146.  See FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 596 (1981) (“Our 
opinions have repeatedly emphasized that the Commission’s judgment regarding 
how the public interest is best served is entitled to substantial judicial 
deference.”). 
 147.  Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945); see also Turner 
I, 512 U.S. at 657 (“[F]reedom of speech does not disable the government from 
taking steps to ensure that private interests not restrict . . . the free flow of 
information and ideas.”). 
 148.  Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 369 (1969). 
 149.  Id. at 392. 
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Supreme Court based its reasoning primarily on the scarcity 
rationale, which is the theory that more restrictive regulation is 
justified in broadcast media because it is a limited access 
platform.150 This rationale is given less weight today due to the 
rapid evolution of the internet and alternative media forms, but 
the Supreme Court has also used other theories to uphold 
broadcast media regulations, such as the pervasive presence 
theory.151 This theory proffers that broadcast media is so prevalent 
and hard to avoid at times that government regulation will not 
offend First Amendment principles the way similar regulation of 
print media would.152 The Supreme Court invoked this theory 
when it upheld FCC indecency regulations against broadcast 
media.153 Indeed, the Supreme Court believes that the FCC “is 
entitled to take into account the reality that in a very real sense 
listeners and viewers constitute a ‘captive audience.’”154 
While these Supreme Court opinions support FCC regulation, 
the complexity for the News Distortion Doctrine arises when the 
editorial discretion standard is considered.155 The Supreme Court 
has stated that “[p]ublic and private broadcasters alike are not 
only permitted, but indeed required, to exercise substantial 
editorial discretion in the selection and presentation of their 
programming.”156 Broadcasters are afforded “the widest possible 
journalistic freedom consistent with its public obligations,” and the 
FCC may only regulate them under the authority of the 
 
 150.  See id. at 390 (“Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the 
Government is permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose 
views should be expressed on this unique medium.”). 
 151.  See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (“[T]he broadcast 
media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all 
Americans.”). 
 152.  See id. (noting that the “broadcast audience is constantly tuning in and 
out” which makes it hard to protect the “viewer from unexpected program 
content”). 
 153.  See id. (reasoning that “offensive, indecent material presented over the 
airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but in the privacy of the 
home . . .”). 
 154.  CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 127 (1973). 
 155.  See Affiliated Media, Inc., 28 FCC Rcd 14873, 14881 (2013) (declining to 
take action against a license assignment applicant because, even if the distortion 
allegations were found to be true, the actions were considered to be within the 
applicant’s editorial discretion). 
 156.  Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 674 (1998). 
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Communications Act of 1934 “when the interests of the public are 
found to outweigh the private journalistic interests of the 
broadcasters.”157 Under this framework, the government’s 
regulatory role is to ensure that editorial discretion remains in 
furtherance of the public interest, not in conflict with it.158 
C. Regulation in this Area Furthers FCC Objectives and First 
Amendment Principles 
FCC regulation of corporate media’s financial conflicts of 
interest would further the FCC’s dual purpose of ensuring that 
broadcasters (1) present factually based news and (2) promote an 
informed citizenry.159 The undisclosed conflicts undermine this 
dual purpose and are inconsistent with the First Amendment’s 
ideals.160 
The FCC is most comfortable regulating a broadcaster when 
that broadcaster has slanted or misrepresented the news in order 
“to further the [broadcaster’s] business interests.”161 The examples 
provided in Part III fit comfortably within this description.162 
Consider the GE/NBC example discussed above.163 The leaked 
internal NBC memorandum highlighted a direct link between 
NBC’s actions related to Phil Donahue’s show and GE’s business 
interests with the U.S. Defense Department.164 Next, consider the 
Pentagon Pundit Program example.165 The military analysts’ 
financial relationships to the Defense Department presented 
 
 157.  CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 110 (1973). 
 158.  See id. at 111 (discussing the FCC’s now-repealed Fairness Doctrine and 
noting that the broadcaster’s “discretion is bounded by rules designed to assure 
that the public interest in fairness is furthered”). 
 159.  See cases cited supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 160.  See discussion supra Part III (presenting numerous examples of 
undisclosed conflicts on television networks).  
 161.  See case cited supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 162.  See supra Part III (providing examples of news distortion and financial 
conflicts of interest on television networks). 
 163.  See supra Section III.A (describing NBC’s financial ties to the Defense 
Department and its cancellation of Phil Donahue’s show). 
 164.  See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
 165.  See supra Section III.B (detailing the coordinated Defense Department 
efforts to have media analysts advocate for the Iraq war). 
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financial conflict of interests that, while not directly sourced to the 
networks, raise the same misrepresentation problem.166 The media 
has an immensely powerful role in shaping public opinion, and 
thus the viewing public’s ability to develop informed opinions is 
harmed when crucial information is omitted.167 
Moreover, these undisclosed financial conflicts of interest are 
inconsistent with the First Amendment’s purpose of “preserv[ing] 
an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.”168 This is evidenced by the 
disproportionate amount of time media networks have spent 
presenting the government’s official position at the expense of 
other viewpoints, specifically in times of war.169 This reality 
compromises the “dominant paradigm” of the marketplace of ideas 
and necessitates fresh thinking on how that marketplace can 
actually be achieved.170 
Although it appears counterintuitive, compelling arguments 
have been made that government regulation is sometimes 
necessary to further democratic values of free speech.171 All 
government action relating to speech is understandably suspect 
 
 166.  See id. (describing the Pentagon Pundit Program and the multitude of 
incidents in which broadcast networks hosted military analysts without 
disclosing their financial conflicts of interest). 
 167.  See ROBERT ENTMAN, PROJECTIONS OF POWER:  FRAMING NEWS, PUBLIC 
OPINION, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 6 (2004) (describing the phenomenon of 
“substantive framing” in mass media and the impact that it has on public 
opinion); see also EDWARD S. HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY, MANUFACTURING 
CONSENT:  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MASS MEDIA 2 (2d ed. 2002) (analyzing 
mass media’s corporate structures and the outsized role they play in influencing 
public opinion). 
 168.  Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). 
 169.  See Bejesky, supra note 124, at 361–62 (noting study findings conducted 
over a one-week period that “of the 267 on-camera sources, [75%] were current or 
former government officials, just [6%] were skeptics about the need for war, and 
less than [1%] were identified with anti-war activism”); see also id. at 359 (citing 
a University of Maryland study that found a “symbiotic relationship between 
policymakers and the press” during coverage of the Iraq war); Hannibal Travis, 
Media Self-Censorship:  Postmodern Censorship of Pacifist Content on Television 
and the Internet, 25 N.D. J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 47, 62 (noting that, during the 
Gulf War of 1991, “[n]ational anti-war leaders appeared on television about [99%] 
less often than national leaders in support of the war.”). 
 170.  Bejesky, supra note 124, at 357. 
 171.  See CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH xix 
(1st ed. 1993) (devoting “particular attention to the possibility that government 
controls on the broadcast media, designed to ensure diversity of view and 
attention to public affairs, would help the system of free expression”). 
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and “thought to compromise First Amendment principles,” but 
these particular financial conflicts of interest present a unique case 
where government action has the ability to “actually promote those 
very principles.”172 According to legal theorist Thomas I. Emerson, 
there are four primary functions of democratic freedom of 
expression, two of which are to “advance knowledge and discover[] 
truth,” and “to provide for participation in decision making by all 
members of society.”173 These functions echo both the FCC’s and 
Supreme Court’s statements on free expression.174 The conflicts of 
interest presented in Part III are incompatible with these 
fundamental principles.175 Such vital First Amendment issues 
command their own discussion and will be explored at length in 
Part VI.176 
D. The News Distortion Doctrine Cannot Address These Issues, 
but the Principles Behind It Can 
The New Distortion Doctrine is unable to address the 
distortion issues presented in Part III.177 First, it only applies to 
licensed broadcast stations.178 It thus does not reach any 
undisclosed financial conflicts of interest on cable networks such 
as MSNBC, CNN, and Fox News. Second, the FCC’s inability to 
independently enforce the Doctrine renders it largely “symbolic” as 
“suggested by the paucity of distortion decisions against 
broadcasters, and of significant penalties assessed.”179 This 
presumably does little to discourage broadcasters from engaging in 
this type of behavior.180 Third, the distortion issues identified in 
 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6–9 (1970). 
 174.  See discussion supra Section IV (outlining both the Supreme Court’s and 
FCC’s views on freedom of expression). 
 175.  See supra Part III (providing examples of news distortion and financial 
conflicts of interest on television networks). 
 176.  See infra Part IV.  
 177.  See supra Part III.  
 178.  See case cited supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 179.  Raphael, supra note 5, at 510. 
 180.  See Timmer supra note 35, at 22 (providing examples of news distortion 
allegations from as recently as 2016). 
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Part III would not fall under the current Doctrine.181 While the 
fourth element (implication of a significant news event) of the 
FCC’s policy will presumably be met, the first three impose higher 
burdens of proof that are rarely met, as evidenced by the FCC’s 
inability to reach a finding of news distortion on the overwhelming 
majority of occasions.182 Fourth, the FCC’s caselaw indicates that 
it seems unsure of what is and is not actionable news distortion 
under its own policy.183 For example, the FCC has stated that 
broadcaster news manipulations that are intended to serve their 
business interests are more worthy of FCC intervention than other 
types of distortion.184 However, the FCC contradicted this 
assertion in the previously discussed Affiliated Media, Inc. case, in 
which it said that evidence of news manipulation intended to serve 
the broadcaster’s business interests would not rise to the level of 
distortion.185 This inconsistency can be attributed to the 
amorphous construction of the policy which enables the FCC’s 
interpretation to vary from case to case.186 This can make it hard 
for the broadcasters to determine whether they will face FCC 
scrutiny the next time they have to apply for a license renewal.187 
 
 181.  See supra Section II.A (deducing the four elements of news distortion 
under current policy as (1) intent to slant or mislead, (2) extrinsic evidence to 
support the allegation, (3) knowledge from management or upper-level personnel, 
and (4) implication of a significant news event).  
 182.  See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text. 
 183.  See supra Section II.B (analyzing the FCC’s distortion cases over the last 
several decades). 
 184.  See supra notes 126–129 and accompanying text. 
 185.  See Affiliated Media, Inc., 28 FCC Rcd. 14873, 14881 (2013) (stating that 
allegations of a corporate owner of multiple Alaskan broadcast stations 
“tailor[ing] the news” in order to be more “favorable to [its] corporate 
interests . . . even if true, would be insufficient to make out a prima facie showing” 
of news distortion). 
 186.  See supra Section II.B (analyzing the FCC’s distortion cases over the last 
several decades). 
 187.  See Michael D. Bramble Complaint Against Paul Bunyan Broad. Co., 58 
F.C.C.2d 565, 572 (1976) (asserting that “that the deliberate suppression or 
attempted suppression of news because of the licensee’s private interests” 
constitutes “a form of ‘rigging,’ ‘slanting,’ or ‘deliberate distortion’ of the overall 
news presentation of the station.”). But see Affiliated Media, 28 FCC Rcd. at 14881 
(stating that allegations of distortion expressly motivated by business interests 
“would be insufficient” to constitute news distortion). 
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V. Authorizing and Proposing a Financial Conflict of Interest 
Disclosure Rule 
A. The Proposed Disclosure Rule Should Apply to Networks 
Hosted on Cable and Satellite 
The FCC’s rationale behind its news distortion policy is 
straightforward:  It considers news distortion to be a “heinous act 
against the public interest” that harms “the public’s ability to 
handle its affairs.”188 The policy’s purpose of reducing news 
distortion will be furthered by its application to cable networks, 
due to their “outsized” impact on public perception.189 While cable 
news garners the least number of viewers among the three primary 
television news mediums (local television news, national networks 
such as CBS and NBC, and cable networks), its viewership group 
spends significantly more time watching than the other two 
viewership groups.190 Even heavy viewers of local television news 
and network news have been found to spend more time watching 
cable news than these other news mediums.191 This “deeper level 
of viewer engagement” helps explain why cable news is perceived 
as having “an outsized ability to influence the national debate and 
news agenda.”192 The reality of this influence heightens the 
importance of applying the news distortion policy to cable.193 
 
 188.  Complaints Covering CBS Program “Hunger in America,” 20 F.C.C.2d 
143, 151 (1969). 
 189.  See Nareissa L. Smith, Consumer Protection in the Marketplace of Ideas:  
A Proposal to Extend the News Distortion Doctrine to Cable Television News 
Programs, 40 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 223, 235–37 (2015) (examining studies on cable 
news and noting that these outlets have a significant, and at times “outsized,” 
ability to influence the public). 
 190.  See Mark Jurkowitz & Amy Mitchell, How Americans Get TV News at 
Home, PEW RESEARCH CENTER:  JOURNALISM & MEDIA (Oct. 11, 2013), 
https://www.journalism.org/2013/10/11/how-americans-get-tv-news-at-home/ 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2020) (“On average, the cable news audience devotes twice 
as much time to that news source as local and network viewers spend on those 
platforms.”) [perma.cc/TS5Q-46KN]. 
 191.  See id. (“The heaviest local news viewers spend, on average, 11 more 
minutes watching cable news than local news. The heaviest network news 
viewers spend about one more minute watching cable news than they do network 
news.”). 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  See Smith, supra note 188, at 237 (“In sum, cable news is more popular 
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B. The FCC Has Authority to Regulate Cable and Satellite, but It 
Is Limited 
In this administrative area, the courts have given Congress 
and the FCC significant latitude to determine the extent of the 
FCC’s jurisdiction.194 With regard to cable networks in particular, 
the Supreme Court held in United States v. Southwestern Cable 
Co.195 that the FCC’s jurisdiction extends to cable.196 In that case, 
the FCC issued rules limiting the extent to which cable television 
operators could expand their service, and the issue was whether 
the FCC had the authority to make this rule and issue a 
prohibitory order to enforce it.197 Holding in favor of the FCC, the 
Supreme Court determined that the FCC had “reasonably 
concluded that regulatory authority over [cable television] is 
imperative if it is to perform with appropriate effectiveness certain 
of its other responsibilities.”198 The Court concluded that the FCC’s 
authority to regulate cable extended only to actions considered to 
be “reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the [FCC’s] 
various responsibilities for the regulation of television 
broadcasting.”199 In light of this decision, the FCC proceeded to 
promulgate rules governing cable television in 1972.200 This 
included rules such as “equal time, sponsorship identification and 
other provisions similar to [those] applicable to broadcasters.”201 
 
than its counterparts, its viewers are more engaged, and cable news is the most 
accepted source of news for politics, business, and social issues.”). 
 194.  See Galloway v. FCC, 778 F.2d 16, 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“[W]ithin the 
constraints of the Constitution, Congress and the [FCC] may set the scope of 
broadcast regulation . . . .”). 
 195.  See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968) 
(holding that the FCC’s jurisdiction extends to cable). 
 196.  See id. (“[W]e therefore hold that the [FCC’s] authority over ‘all 
interstate . . . communication by wire or radio’ permits the regulation of CATV [or 
cable] systems.”). 
 197.  See id. at 166–67 (describing the factual history behind the FCC’s rule 
proposals and the subsequent legal issues that arose from those actions). 
 198.  See id. at 173. 
 199.  Id. at 178. 
 200.  See Cable Television, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (last 
updated Dec. 15, 2015), https://www.fcc.gov/media/engineering/cable-television 
(last visited Feb. 21, 2020) (describing the extensive history of the FCC’s cable 
television regulation) [perma.cc/9Q3K-W6AV]. 
 201.  Id. 
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Congress later passed the Cable Communications Policy Act of 
1984, which affirmatively established the FCC’s authority to 
regulate cable television.202 The FCC’s regulatory authority over 
satellite is similar to that of cable.203 
Legal scholars have proposed to extend the News Distortion 
Doctrine to cable television, and that proposal is adopted here for 
the disclosure rule.204 The scope of this regulatory authority, 
however, is limited.205 Therefore, this Note proposes that Congress 
amend the Communications Act of 1934 to give the FCC explicit 
statutory authorization to promulgate disclosure requirements 
applicable to cable and satellite providers, in addition to licensed 
broadcasters. 
C. Applying the Disclosure Rule to Cable and Satellite:  Proposing 
a Statutory Amendment to the Communications Act of 1934 
Section 612 of the Communications Act of 1934, which is 
codified as 47 U.S.C. § 532 and governs the use of “cable channels 
for commercial use,” should be amended to expressly authorize and 
direct the FCC to promulgate disclosure requirements for video 
programming provided through multichannel video programming 
distributors.206 The term “multichannel video programming 
distributors” is proposed in order to encompass both cable and 
satellite providers, which host the network channels.207 The model 
statutory amendment will read as follows: 
 
 202.  See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 
Stat. 2779 (“To amend the Communications Act of 1934 to provide a national 
policy regarding cable television.”). 
 203.  See Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(upholding § 25 of the 1992 Cable Act which required direct broadcast satellite 
(DBS) providers to allocate channels for noncommercial and educational 
programming). 
 204.  See Smith, supra note 188, at 263–64 (proposing to extend the News 
Distortion Doctrine’s application to cable news). 
 205.  See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180, 223–25 (1997) 
(upholding the FCC’s content-neutral must-carry rules but declining to address 
the scope of the decision’s applicability to content-based regulations). 
 206.  47 U.S.C. § 532 (2018). 
 207.  See 47 U.S.C. § 522(13) (2018) (“[T]he term ‘multichannel video 
programming distributor’ means a person such as, but not limited to, a cable 
operator, . . . a direct broadcast satellite service, or a television receive-only 
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Synopsis. “An Act to amend the Communications Act of 1934 to 
provide increased transparency for viewers and to promote the 
public’s interest in enhanced public discussion and an informed 
citizenry.” 
Section 1. Financial Conflict of Interest Disclosure 
Requirement. 
(a) Authority to Enforce. Section 612 of the Communications 
Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. § 532) is amended in the following 
ways: 
(1) subsection (c)(2) is amended by adding the 
following clause at the end of its paragraph:  “and may 
require disclosure regulations pursuant only to the 
requirements of subsection (k)”; 
(2) subsection (h) is amended by adding the 
following sentence at the end:  “This subsection shall 
also permit a multichannel video programming 
distributor, as defined under 47 U.S.C. § 522, to enforce 
a written and published financial disclosure policy in 
accordance with subsection (k).” 
(b) Commission Regulations. Subsection 612 of the 
Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. § 532) is amended by 
inserting after subsection (j) the following new subsection: 
“(k) Within 120 days following the date of the enactment of this 
subsection, the Commission shall initiate a rulemaking 
proceeding to prescribe regulations requiring on-air financial 
disclosures of an on-air person’s or entity’s financial conflict(s) 
of interest, during any discussion of U.S. military action or 
proposed U.S. military action. The regulations shall define 
financial conflicts of interest for the purposes of this subsection 
and provide clear disclosure guidelines with which 
multichannel video programming distributors must comply.”208 
The statutory language is modeled after amendments that 
were made to this same section as part of the Cable Television 
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 (Cable Act of 
1992).209 The framework authorizes cable and satellite providers to 
 
satellite program distributor, who makes available for purchase, by subscribers 
or customers, multiple channels of video programming[.]”). 
 208.  See 47 U.S.C. § 532 (2018); see generally Cable Television Consumer 
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, § 10, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 
(providing the textual template for the statutory amendment proposal). 
 209.  See 47 U.S.C. § 532 (2018) (authorizing both cable operators and the FCC 
to regulate indecent programming). 
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publish and enforce the disclosure rules themselves, in the same 
way that the Cable Act of 1992 authorized cable operators to 
publish and enforce indecency regulations.210 This amendment will 
provide the express congressional authority necessary for the FCC 
to promulgate the financial conflicts of interest disclosure 
requirement presented in the following subsection. 
D. Proposing a Financial Conflicts of Interest Disclosure 
Requirement 
To address the news distortion issues presented in Part III, 
the following model regulation is proposed to be promulgated by 
the FCC: 
Financial Conflicts of Interest Disclosure Requirement. 
(a) A financial conflict of interest, for the purpose of this rule, is 
defined as a financial relationship in which a person or entity 
who will appear on-air to discuss an ongoing, proposed, or 
potential U.S. military action, has, either directly or through a 
third party, a personal financial interest in the affairs of the 
U.S. Defense Department. 
(b) On-air disclosure of a financial conflict of interest is required 
if the following two elements are met:  (1) An ongoing, proposed, 
or potential U.S. military action is being discussed on-air, and 
(2) a person on-air to discuss the action, or the multichannel 
video programming distributor or television network, has a 
financial conflict of interest as defined by subsection (a). 
(c) The disclosure required by subsection (b) shall be provided 
for the entirety of the on-air discussion and shall fully disclose 
the identity of the third party, if such third party exists, that is 
the source of the financial conflict of interest. 
The rule must be promulgated in accordance with the 
requirements set forth by the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA).211 It will apply to all network channels hosted by cable and 
satellite providers, as authorized by the proposed statutory 
authorization. The disclosure rule should also be applied to 
 
 210.  See id. (authorizing cable operators to enforce “a written and published 
policy” regulating indecent programming). 
 211.  See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018) (prescribing the rule making procedures for 
agency action). 
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licensed broadcasters in addition to, not in place of, the current 
News Distortion Doctrine.212 This ensures the rule’s applicability 
to all networks addressed in Part III.213 The FCC shall have the 
authority to enforce fines for the violations of the rule, as it does 
for other promulgated regulations.214 
The proposed rule follows the principle of current FCC rules 
requiring on-air disclosure of any programming that the station 
has been paid to air.215 In addition, the proposal is in effect a 
codification of transparency principles that exist in ethical codes 
for both journalism and television news.216 For example, the Public 
Broadcasting Service, in its Editorial Standards and Practices, 
states that “transparency requires that producers disclose to the 
audience all sources of funding for the production and distribution 
of content.”217 
This rule imposes an affirmative duty on broadcasters and 
television networks to be aware of any existing financial conflicts 
of interest before they air programming related to U.S. military 
action. This duty will ensure that the viewing public is provided 
 
 212.  See supra note 3 and accompanying text. (discussing the News Distortion 
Doctrine). 
 213.  See supra Part III (providing detailed examples of undisclosed financial 
conflicts of interest in both broadcast and cable media). 
 214.  See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 258 (2012) 
(striking down fines, levied against Fox and ABC for violations of the FCC’s 
indecency rules, on “fair notice grounds,” not on the FCC’s authority to impose 
the fines). 
 215.  See 47 U.S.C. § 317 (2018) (“All matter broadcast by any radio station for 
which any money . . . is directly or indirectly paid [to] . . . the station so 
broadcasting, from any person, shall . . . be announced as paid or furnished, as 
the case may be, by such person . . . .”). 
 216.  See Code of Ethics, RADIO TELEVISION DIGITAL NEWS ASS’N (June 11, 
2015), https://www.rtdna.org/content/rtdna_code_of_ethics (last visited Feb. 21, 
2020) (“[I]ndependence from influences that conflict with [the] public interest 
remains an essential ideal of journalism. Transparency provides the public with 
the means to assess credibility and to determine who deserves trust.”) 
[perma.cc/7QAV-2RPB]; see also SPJ Code of Ethics, SOC’Y OF PRO. JOURNALISTS 
(Sept. 6, 2014), https://www.spj.org/ethicscode.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2020) 
(stating that journalists should “[d]isclose unavoidable conflicts” and “[i]dentify 
content provided by outside sources, whether paid or not.”) [perma.cc/EL48-
R3BF].  
 217.  PBS Editorial Standards and Practices, PUBLIC BROADCASTING SERVICE 
(last updated Aug. 2018), https://www.pbs.org/about/producing-pbs/editorial-
standards/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2020) [perma.cc/8ZS3-4YT6]. 
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with vital context when receiving information on an incredibly 
sensitive news topic.218 
VI. First Amendment Constitutional Analysis 
There are, of course, serious First Amendment concerns raised 
by any proposal to the government to regulate the media.219 This 
Part addresses those concerns and argues that the rule does not 
chill, suppress, or compel speech, but rather promotes speech in 
the spirit of the First Amendment. 
It is worth noting at the outset that the statutory amendment 
proposal raises the preliminary constitutional issue of Congress’ 
authority to pass the law and delegate responsibilities to the 
FCC.220 The Communications Act of 1934 was passed under the 
constitutional authority of the Commerce Clause, and Congress 
has long had the authority to delegate certain powers to 
government agencies, so these issues will not be addressed here.221 
In the FCC regulatory context, there are two separate groups 
with competing First Amendment interests that must be balanced:  
The viewing public on one hand and networks, cable operators, 
broadcasters, and other media entities on the other.222 The 
Supreme Court has stated that it “is the right of the viewers and 
listeners, not the right of broadcasters, which is paramount.”223 
The forthcoming constitutional analysis necessarily focuses on the 
interests of the latter groups, considering that they bear the 
 
 218.  See Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 
1254 (1949) (emphasizing the importance of presenting news and information “in 
as complete and impartial a manner as possible”). 
 219.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of . . . the press . . . .”). 
 220.  See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) 
(requiring Congress to articulate an “intelligible principle” before it delegates 
authority to a government agency). 
 221.  See id. (holding that Congress may delegate its authority subject to 
certain limitations); see also 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2018) (creating the FCC for “the 
purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication”). 
 222.  See CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102–03, 110 (1973) 
(discussing the need to weigh the “interests of the public” with the “private 
journalistic interests of the broadcasters” to determine when regulatory action is 
appropriate). 
 223.  Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).  
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burden of compliance with the proposed regulation.224 The viewing 
public’s First Amendment interests, however, are the motivating 
factor behind this rule proposal, and the objective here is to 
demonstrate that the furtherance of one does not require the 
constraint of the other.225 
A. The Standard of Review for Media Regulations 
Although broadcast media regulations receive less 
constitutional scrutiny than print media regulations, cable media 
is subject to more demanding scrutiny than broadcast.226 These 
legal distinctions have become increasingly questioned in recent 
years by Supreme Court Justices and legal scholars alike.227 This 
debate is beyond the scope of this Note and is ultimately 
immaterial, because the standard of review analysis here will rest 
solely on whether the challenged regulations are content-based or 
content-neutral.228  
In Turner I, the Supreme Court held that when reviewing the 
constitutionality of government regulations imposed on cable, 
intermediate scrutiny will be applied to content-neutral 
regulations while strict scrutiny will be applied to content-based 
regulations.229 The Court’s reason for the distinction was 
straightforward and has been a settled First Amendment principle 
 
 224.  See supra Section V.D. Proposing a Financial Conflicts of Interest Disclosure 
Requirement(applying the proposed rule to broadcasters, cable operators, and 
satellite providers). 
 225.  See supra Section IV.C (arguing that FCC regulation would promote 
First Amendment principles). 
 226.  See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 748 (highlighting broadcast’s more “limited 
First Amendment protection” compared to print); see also Turner Broad. Sys. v. 
F.C.C. (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994) (“[T]he rationale for applying a less 
rigorous standard of First Amendment scrutiny to broadcast regulation . . . does 
not apply in the context of cable regulation.”). 
 227.  See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 532–33 (2009) 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (“The justifications relied on by the Court in Red Lion 
and Pacifica . . . neither distinguish broadcast from cable, nor explain the relaxed 
application of the principles of the First Amendment to broadcast.”). 
 228.  See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 662 (concluding that intermediate scrutiny, as 
opposed to strict scrutiny, will apply to content-neutral cable regulations). 
 229.  See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180, 213 (1997) 
(“Content-neutral regulations do not pose the same ‘inherent dangers to free 
expression’ . . . that content-based regulations do . . . .”). 
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for some time:  Content-based speech regulations are 
constitutionally suspect because they are more likely to have the 
effect of unconstitutionally suppressing speech, while 
content-neutral rules that only regulate the time, place, or manner 
of speech do not carry that same risk.230 
The Supreme Court in Turner I reviewed the constitutionality 
of the FCC’s “so-called must-carry” rules, “which require cable 
operators to carry the signals of a specified number of local 
broadcast television stations.”231 The Court found these rules to be 
content-neutral, reasoning that they did not “impose[] a 
restriction, penalty, or burden by reason of the views, programs, or 
stations the cable operator has selected or will select.”232 In its 
second hearing of the case, the Court ultimately held these rules 
to be constitutional under the intermediate scrutiny standard of 
review.233 
B. Constitutional Analysis of Financial Conflicts of Interest Rule 
Proposal 
There may be a strained argument that the proposed 
disclosure rule is content-neutral but, based on the Supreme 
Court’s Turner I precedent, a court will likely find it to be 
content-based.234 The rule expressly applies to discussions of “U.S. 
military actions” so its application is contingent on the content of 
the speech.235 Thus, a court would apply strict scrutiny when 
reviewing a constitutional challenge to this rule.236 
 
 230.  See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 676 (“The government does have the power to 
impose content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions . . . .”). 
 231.  Id. at 630. 
 232.  Id. at 644. 
 233.  See Turner II, 520 U.S. at 224 (concluding that it will not “displace 
Congress’ judgment respecting content-neutral regulations with our own.”). 
 234.  See Turner Broad. Sys. v. F.C.C. (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 644 (1994) 
(finding the must-carry rules to be content-neutral because they do not impose “a 
restriction, penalty, or burden by reason of the views, programs, or stations the 
cable operator has selected or will select.”). 
 235.  See supra Section V.D (proposing financial disclosure rule).  
 236.  See Turner I, 512 U.S. at 643 (stating that “laws that by their terms 
distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or 
views expressed are content-based . . .”). 
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It does not follow, however, that any content-based law will 
fail, as content-based laws have passed strict scrutiny before.237 In 
fact, the FCC has a number of content-based regulations applicable 
to licensed broadcasters, such as access requirements for political 
candidates, station identification requirements, and restrictions 
on obscene and indecent programming.238 The indecency 
restrictions currently apply to cable but, regardless, the proposed 
statutory amendment unambiguously extends content-based 
regulatory authority to cable and satellite providers.239 
 A content-based law is constitutional if the government can 
prove to the court that it has a compelling interest, or purpose, for 
regulating the content and that the means chosen were narrowly 
tailored to achieve that purpose.240 
First, the government has a compelling interest in promoting 
an informed citizenry able “to handle its affairs,” especially when 
it comes to an issue as consequential as military action.241 The 
purpose thus promotes the public’s First Amendment “right to 
form and hold beliefs” in furtherance of “a system of freedom of 
expression.”242 The Supreme Court has recognized the importance 
of this interest, stating that the “First Amendment’s command that 
government not impede the freedom of speech does not disable the 
government from taking steps to ensure that private interests [do] 
not restrict . . . the free flow of information and ideas.”243 
Second, the disclosure requirement is narrowly tailored to 
serve the public’s First Amendment interests. It applies only to 
 
 237.  See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (holding that a state 
law, which prohibits vote solicitation at polling places on election days, survives 
strict scrutiny); see also Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 26–29 
(2010) (upholding a law under a strict scrutiny analysis which prohibited the 
provision of support to designated foreign terrorist organizations). 
 238.  See THE PUBLIC AND BROADCASTING, supra note 3, at 12–19 (listing the 
regulations applicable to all broadcasters). 
 239.  See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 
§ 10, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (authorizing both cable operators and 
the FCC to regulate indecent programming). 
 240.   See Burson, 504 U.S. at 199 (stating that the government “must 
demonstrate that its law is necessary to serve the asserted interest”). 
 241.  Complaints Covering CBS Program “Hunger in America,” 20 F.C.C.2d 
143, 151 (1969). 
 242.  EMERSON, supra note 173, at 21–22. 
 243.  Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 657 (1994). 
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discussions about U.S. military action, preventing potential 
overreach into unintended areas and ensuring that networks are 
able to clearly comply with its requirements.244 In addition, the 
rule does not suppress or censor speech but only requires public 
disclosure.245 Challengers to this rule would argue that this is not 
a mild disclosure requirement but a form of compelled speech.246 
The Supreme Court disagrees, however, as it addressed this issue 
in Citizens United v. FEC247 and held that a disclosure requirement 
for political campaign advertisements was constitutional.248 The 
Court reasoned that the requirement did not violate the First 
Amendment because it “insure[s] that the voters are fully informed 
about who is speaking” and is “the less restrictive alternative to 
more comprehensive speech regulations.”249 
Here, the FCC could seek to prohibit or limit on-air discussions 
where financial conflicts of interest exist, which would quite 
clearly be speech suppression.250 A second alternative is to do 
nothing and leave the issue unaddressed, in which case the public’s 
First Amendment interest in a fully informed citizenry would be 
undermined.251 
For these reasons, the proposed financial conflicts of interest 
disclosure rule should be upheld as constitutional under a strict 
scrutiny standard of review. 
 
 
 244.  See supra Section V.D (proposing financial disclosure rule). 
 245.  See supra Section V.D (proposing financial disclosure rule). 
 246.  See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796 (noting that the First 
Amendment protects both “compelled speech and compelled silence”). 
 247.  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 315 (2010) (holding that the 
disclaimer and disclosure requirements are constitutional because they do not 
“prevent anyone from speaking . . .”). 
 248.  See id. at 16 (stating that the advertisements in question “avoid 
confusion by making clear that the ads are not funded by a candidate or political 
party”). 
 249.  Id. at 315–16. 
 250.  See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 528 (1960) (Black, J. 
concurring) (emphasizing that “First Amendment rights are beyond abridgment” 
whether it is through direct restraint or suppression). 
 251.  See supra note 127 and accompanying text (discussing the FCC’s 
statement against news distortion). 
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VII. Conclusion 
The FCC created the News Distortion Doctrine in response to 
a recognition that news can be manipulated by broadcasters in a 
way that misleads the public and undermines its ability to “handle 
its affairs.”252 The policy reasons behind the Doctrine are 
compelling and seek to further the First Amendment’s ideals, but 
the Doctrine itself has failed to do so.253 The Doctrine is unduly 
hard to satisfy, the FCC has rarely enforced it when it appears it 
has been satisfied, and it only applies to a subset of mass media.254 
This Note has proposed a novel way of thinking about news 
distortion in order to advance the objectives behind the Doctrine.255 
As shown in Part III, serious distortion issues persist throughout 
televised media, in which central information on vital public 
matters are not disclosed to the public.256 The FCC should 
promulgate disclosure rules applicable to media networks in 
broadcast, cable, and satellite in order to address these issues, and 
Congress should pass a statutory amendment to the 
Communications Act of 1934 to authorize this regulation.257 This 
issue presents the rare situation where government regulation will 
further the First Amendment’s ideals to the public’s benefit.258 
 
 252.  Complaints Covering CBS Program “Hunger in America,” 20 F.C.C. 2d 
143, 151 (1969). 
 253.  See supra Section IV.D (proposing financial disclosure rule). 
 254.  See id. (proposing financial disclosure rule).  
 255.  See supra Part IV (explaining why undisclosed financial conflicts of 
interest should be thought of as news distortion). 
 256.  See supra Part III (providing examples of how undisclosed financial 
conflicts of interest misled the public).  
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